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 Non-technical summary 
The contributions of information and communication technology (ICT) to firm performance have 
received major attention in recent years. Several studies have highlighted the importance of 
complementary organisational changes as prerequisites for making ICT work productively. Most 
studies fail to present a specific link between ICT and performance, however.  
The focus of this paper is to investigate to what extent ICT applications foster product and process 
innovations by enhancing organisational flexibility. We argue that ICT primarily facilitates 
communication and access to information and thus favours the use of easily programmable 
machines, co-operation between non-managerial workers within firms as well as the co-ordination 
of business processes between work groups. These functions increase organisational flexibility, i.e. 
the ability of firms to react flexibly to changes in consumer preferences and allow the participation 
of employees on strategic decisions. Moreover, improvements in ICT facilitate the codification of 
knowledge and supply chain management and thus make outsourcing and co-operation with other 
firms less costly.  
In our analysis on the impact of ICT on flexibility, we distinguish between functional flexibility 
(the ability of workers to co-operate and take decentralised decisions) and numerical flexibility (the 
reduction of fixed costs, mainly due to outsourcing business processes). Functional flexibility is 
measured by the share of employees working in teams, in job rotation, in quality circles or in 
autonomous groups. Numerical flexibility is proxied by two indicators: first, outsourcing activities 
over the past three years as reported by the firms, and, second, the share of intermediate goods and 
services in sales as a measure of accumulated outsourcing decisions during the past. With regard to 
technology use, we distinguish between various types of ICT applications and investments. For our 
empirical analysis, we use representative, large-scale and topical panel data from Germany 
including small and medium-sized firms. 
The estimations reveal that ICT use and investment are associated with an increase in both 
functional and numerical flexibility. The implications for innovation activities differ, however. 
Our measure of functional flexibility is strongly positively associated with product and process 
innovations. In contrast, outsourcing allows firms to ‘buy’ innovations in the short run, but reduces 
innovative capacity in the longer run. The latter result may be a consequence of conflicting 
strategic innovation interests.  
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1 Introduction 
The contributions of information and communication technology (ICT) to firm performance have 
received major attention in recent years. Most existing studies find substantial productivity 
contributions of ICT (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2003; Hempell, 2005c; Matteucci et al., 2005). 
Several studies highlight, however, that ICT is no panacea but merely an ‘enabling technology’ 
whose productive usage requires complementary activities by firms. They argue that ICT, unlike 
other capital goods, primarily supports innovations by improving possibilities of co-operation and 
information sharing between employees and firms (McEvily et al., 2004) instead of directly 
increasing productivity. This has motivated several authors to highlight the importance of 
complementary organisational changes and innovation efforts as prerequisites for making ICT 
productive (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000; Hempell, 2005a,b). Their main argument is that ICT 
mainly facilitates the flow of information between firms and between employees and reduces 
information costs. In order to reap these benefits, firms have to give employees the possibility to 
react quickly to new information and communicate with each other or other firms (Batt, 1999). 
Some empirical studies provide evidence that productivity of ICT is indeed highest if coupled with 
own innovation activities (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1996; Hempell, 2005b) and with 
organisational changes such as decentralization of decision rights or employee participation 
(Bresnahan et al., 2002; Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2003). None of these empirical studies, however, 
has analysed how and to what extent ICT use and investment enable firms to adjust their 
organisational structures in such ways that they can improve their innovation capabilities. In this 
paper, we argue that innovation success is an important explanation for the productivity effects of 
ICT. Instead of a direct “black-box-link” between ICT and productivity, we demonstrate that ICT 
has an impact on organisational flexibility and that the main part of the effect of ICT on innovation 
success can be explained by this flexibility link. In addition, differentiating between functional and 
numerical flexibility, we highlight specific ways how ICT affects organisation structures in firms. 
In a final step, we analyse the impacts of these different flexibility choices on product and process 
innovations in the short and long run. 
Flexibility plays an increasingly important role for the competitiveness of firms. Technical 
developments shorten innovation cycles and product markets get increasingly segmented and 
customer-oriented. This development requires firms to make production more flexible in order to 
innovate and to provide a greater variety of customised products and services (Piore and Sabel, 
1984). Inspired by seminal work by Atkinson (1984), various studies have highlighted two distinct 
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ways of increasing flexibility: on the one hand, firms try to enhance functional flexibility by 
employing and training workers involved in team work and perform varying tasks; on the other 
hand, firms increasingly source out production processes in order to reduce fixed costs and thus 
increase numerical flexibility.  
By lowering the costs of communication between firms as well as between employees, 
continuously cheaper and more powerful ICT is facilitating the use of easily programmable 
machines, co-operation between non-managerial workers within firms as well as the co-ordination 
of business processes beyond firm boundaries (Bresnahan et al., 2002). This development 
increases the ability of firms to react more flexibly to changes in consumer preferences and to 
enhance communication between employees. Moreover, improvements in ICT facilitate 
codification of knowledge and supply chain management and thus make outsourcing less costly 
(Caroli, 2003).  
Both functional and numerical flexibility may be influential for a firm’s ability to innovate. 
Employees in a functionally flexible work organisation have been argued to be better aware of the 
necessity to innovate and to be in a position to supply their specific knowledge on consumer 
demands and production inefficiencies (Levine and Tyson, 1990; Appelbaum et al., 2000). In 
contrast, the impact of numerical flexibility on innovation appears ambiguous. On the one hand, 
product innovation may be complicated severely if a large number of suppliers is involved in the 
development process. Moreover, strategic goals pursued by suppliers and client firms may be very 
different. On the other hand, purchasing technologically advanced intermediate goods may 
contribute to improve final good quality. In addition, there may be spillover effects between 
supplier and outsourcing firm with respect to the production design which might spur process 
innovations in the outsourcing enterprise. 
Although ICT-enabled organisational flexibility has received broad attention in the economic 
literature (Bresnahan et al., 2002; Black and Lynch, 2004), little effort has been made to 
differentiate the diverse effects of ICT use on different types of flexibility and innovation 
performance. Our paper focuses on these issues accordingly.  
For our empirical analysis, we use representative, large-scale and topical panel data from Germany 
including small and medium-sized firms. One particular advantage of the data is that they provide 
continuous metrics of the usage of functional and numerical flexibility instead of dummy 
variables. Functional flexibility is measured by the share of employees working in teams, in job 
rotation, in quality circles or in autonomous groups. Numerical flexibility is captured by two 
indicators: outsourcing during the past three years and the share of intermediate goods and services 
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in sales as a measure of accumulated outsourcing decisions during the past. In addition, we are 
able to distinguish between the relevance of different types of ICT use and ICT investments for 
flexibility and innovation.  
Our results show that ICT use and investment are associated with an increase in both functional 
and numerical flexibility but that the implications for innovation activities differ. Our measure of 
functional flexibility is strongly positively associated with product innovations. In contrast, 
outsourcing (which is our measure of numerical flexibility) allows firms to ‘buy’ innovations in 
the short run, but reduces innovative capacity in the longer run which may be due to conflicting 
strategic innovation interests. The direct effect of our ICT indicators declines strongly if flexibility 
measures are introduced to explain product or process innovations. This supports the hypothesis 
that ICT is mainly an enabling technology that requires complementary changes in functional 
flexibility. 
The remainder is organised as follows. In section 2, we discuss the theoretical background on 
organisational flexibility, the role of ICT and the impacts of flexibility on innovation success and 
provide a simple empirical model in section 3. In section 4, we briefly describe our data source. 
Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results, and section 6 concludes. 
2 Background 
In this section, we summarise the main theoretical ideas and some empirical evidence about 
functional and numerical flexibility, the role of ICT as an enabler of both types of flexibility, and 
the relevance of organisational flexibility for innovation. 
2.1 Functional and numerical flexibility 
Inspired by Atkinson (1984), a number of studies have established the distinction between two 
basic kinds of organisational flexibility of firms – functional and numerical.1 Functional flexibility 
increases the possibilities to redeploy employees between activities and tasks by empowering 
workers with greater decision-making responsibility and assigning them a greater scope of diverse 
activities. It is frequently associated with team work, autonomous workgroups and flat hierarchies 
(Chadwick and Cappelli, 2002). A key feature of this concept of flexibility is to make workers 
identify closely with the aims of the firm, leading to a higher propensity of workers to co-operate 
with each other, to generate ideas for improving products and processes, and to exert varying 
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activities within the firm (Appelbaum and Batt, 1994; Batt, 1999; OECD, 1999). Moreover, a firm 
resorting to functional flexibility must offer incentives to the employees to mobilise their tacit 
knowledge, which is why functionally flexible firms frequently employ financial incentives based 
on group performance (Macduffie, 1995). Since functional flexibility requires workers to acquire 
complex and firm-specific knowledge, firms resort to highly qualified in-house staff. Empirical 
studies have found functionally flexible firms to be both more productive (Black and Lynch, 2004; 
Zwick, 2004) and more innovative (Hujer and Radic, 2003).  
Numerical flexibility, in contrast, aims at reducing fixed costs by contracting out jobs at reduced 
wages and benefits and buffer the regular work force from fluctuations (Gramm and Schnell, 
2001). This helps firms to externalise risks with respect to demand fluctuations to external 
suppliers. Moreover, some goods and services can be bought cheaper or at higher quality from 
third parties because specialised providers can benefit from economies of scale and learning 
effects (Abraham and Taylor, 1996). For the outsourcing decision, a firm compares the costs 
associated with internal transactions and transactions over the market (Coase, 1937). In addition to 
the market price, the market transaction also incurs transaction costs in the outsourcing enterprise 
when intermediates are implemented in own production routines.  
The two types of flexibility therefore differ in nature and purpose. This is why some researchers 
considered both types of flexibility as substitutes, reflecting opposed competition strategies. 
Functional flexibility is largely based on tacit knowledge, i.e. knowledge that is inseparable from 
the individual, as well as firm-specific knowledge acquired on-the-job or from continued training. 
Tacit knowledge provides competitive advantage for functionally flexible firms because it is 
particularly inimitable and non-substitutable (Hatch and Dyer, 2004). Costs of dismissals and thus 
costs of numerical flexibility are therefore particularly high in these firms since they are associated 
with high losses of tacit knowledge. The competitive advantage of numerical flexibility is mainly 
derived from cost reductions.  
2.2 Flexibility and ICT 
Some studies have argued that investments in and usage of ICT facilitate organisational changes 
that increase the flexibility of firms (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000). These studies do not consider 
how the two partially conflicting flexibility forms are enhanced by cheaper and more powerful 
communication and storage facilities, however. Almost all empirical studies investigating the link 
                                                                                                                                                                
1  For a survey on these concepts, see Kalleberg (2001). 
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between ICT and reorganisation implicitly focus on the impacts of ICT use on functional 
flexibility (or closely related concepts, such as high-performance workplace practices) of firms. 
Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1995) point out that more flexible machinery such as computer-aided 
manufacturing (CAM) favours clusters of complementary innovative workplace practices, 
including team work and decentralisation of decision authority and reduces the set-up time of 
machines. Lindbeck and Snower (2000) and Coutrot (2003) argue that ICT use provides workers 
with rapid and cheap access to information. This facilitates horizontal communication between 
employees. They argue that firms that resort to multitasking and team production (which they coin 
”holistic” organisations) require workers to communicate with each other more intensively than 
”Tayloristic” firms which aim at exploiting productivity potentials mainly by the specialisation of 
workers in specific tasks and hierarchical structures. 
Several empirical studies have provided evidence of a positive link between ICT use and 
functional flexibility. Bresnahan et al. (2002) find for a cross-section of U.S. firms that various 
measures of ICT use are strongly correlated with a measure representing decentralisation. 
Moreover, they report evidence from a survey indicating that managers strongly agree with the 
statement that ICT use increases autonomy of workers. Similarly, Hempell (2005a) finds for a 
large cross-section of German firms that various measures of ICT use are closely associated with 
the presence of team work and subunits with profit responsibility. Bertschek and Kaiser (2004), 
however, do not find any statistically significant evidence that teamwork and flatter hierarchies 
favour ICT productivity. 
While the impact of ICT on functional flexibility has thus received broad attention in the literature, 
the implications for numerical flexibility have remained little explored. As highlighted by Bensaou 
(1997), Innocenti and Labory (2002), and Grossman and Helpman (2002), ICT reduces the costs of 
finding appropriate suppliers, to monitor subcontractors and to co-ordinate ordering, scheduling 
and payment systems between firms. This means that outsourcing of business activities is 
enhanced by ICT use. Moreover, Caroli (2003) argues that ICT encourages coding and 
digitalisation of employees’ knowledge and skills. Therefore tacit knowledge accumulated by 
employees can be incorporated more easily into the firms’ information system by codification. 
Based on case studies, Balconi (2002) argues that increased use of electronic automation and 
measurement instruments has eroded the importance of tacit knowledge among workers at lower 
hierarchy levels and has strengthened tacit knowledge of supervisors and problem-solving staff 
instead.  
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Our data set allows us to test several hypotheses on the relationship between ICT investments and 
usage and both types of flexibility. In the next section, we develop two models that explain the 
numerical and functional flexibility decision of firms including the specific role of ICT. We 
empirically assess the hypotheses derived from the models in section five. 
2.3 The impact of flexibility and ICT on innovations 
Considering the implications of organisational flexibility for innovation, we focus on the capability 
of firms to introduce product innovations (i.e. new or significantly modified products or services) 
and process innovations. In the following, we discuss the role of functional and numerical 
flexibility on innovation success subsequently. 
Functional flexibility: Several observers have argued that functionally flexible enterprises face 
lower barriers to innovate since higher discretion conceded to workers and closer co-operation in 
teams encourages a higher awareness to changing customer needs, joint problem-solving, 
continuous improvements, discovery and utilisation of local knowledge, and reactions to 
inefficiencies in the production process (Lindbeck and Snower, 2000; Cristini et al., 2004; Mahnke 
et al., 2005). Freeman and Lazear (1995) and Zoghi et al. (2005) stress that employees with private 
knowledge on improvement possibilities also need the capacity to act on the information or share it 
with someone who already has such capacity. A functionally flexible firm with decentralised 
decision making attributes this capacity directly to the employee.  
The organisational aspects of functional flexibility have also received considerable attention in the 
innovation literature concerned with absorptive capacity, i.e. the capability of firms to absorb new 
knowledge, assimilate it and apply it to commercial ends (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Van den 
Bosch et al. (1999) argue that organisational forms favouring horizontal communication and co-
operation enhance a firm’s absorptive capacity in two respects: scope, i.e. the breadth of accessible 
knowledge about products, processes or markets; and flexibility; i.e. the extent to which the firm 
can access additional or reconfigure existing knowledge. However, emphasis on horizontal 
communication may harm knowledge absorption with respect to efficiency, since economies of 
scale can be better achieved by more centralised and hierarchical organisations.  
In a case study, Brynjolfsson et al. (1997) show that the joint use of computer-based flexible 
machinery and substantial reorganisation of work towards higher functional flexibility 
dramatically increased the variety of products. Analysing a sample of German establishments, 
Hujer and Radic (2003) find that combining flexible workplace organisation with human resource 
management practices enhances innovation success. Similarly, Michie and Sheehan (1999) show 
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for a sample of British establishments that high-performance workplace practices – including team 
work, incentive pay and a strong focus on communication – are strongly correlated with research 
and development (R&D) efforts. Zoghi et al. (2005) demonstrate for a large panel of Canadian 
establishments that decentralised decision making and information-sharing are positively 
correlated with product and process innovations. 
Numerical flexibility: The theoretical predictions about the consequences of numerical flexibility 
for innovation are by far less clear-cut than for functional flexibility. Some authors highlight that a 
strong focus on numerical flexibility may harm innovation capabilities, at least in the long term. 
Novak and Eppinger (2001) argue that the development of complex products calls for stronger 
vertical integration in order to benefit from investments in specific skills that are needed to co-
ordinate development and production of complex designs. They back this hypothesis with 
evidence from the automobile industry. Supporting this view, Caroli (2003) and Hatch and Dyer 
(2004) highlight the strategic role of tacit knowledge as a prerequisite for innovation and sustained 
competitive advantage. Numerical flexibility (and outsourcing in particular) induces the risk of 
undermining a firm’s base of tacit knowledge and innovation capabilities. Similarly, Chesbrough 
and Teece (1996) argue on the basis of case studies that outsourcing may harm innovation 
capabilities in the long term since loose partnerships of firms carry a larger potential of conflicts of 
interest which may be the more harmful the more complex an innovation process is. 
However, these considerations can be opposed by arguments suggesting a positive effect of 
numerical flexibility on innovation. For example, numerically flexible enterprises can acquire new 
competencies faster in the short run by contracting external specialists or by buying 
technologically advanced components from suppliers (Abraham and Taylor, 1996). Moreover, 
rapid renewal of personnel may be beneficial for firms that introduce radical innovations because 
tenured employees may be attached to outdated processes and resist change (Zwick, 2002).  
3 Empirical Models of Flexibility and Innovation 
This section provides models and hypotheses about the factors determining a firm’s decision to 
introduce numerical and functional flexibility and innovations. 
3.1 Numerical flexibility: a firm’s outsourcing decision 
In order to derive some hypotheses on the determinants of the firms´ outsourcing decisions, we 
employ a simplified variant of the model proposed by Bartel et al. (2005). Suppose producing a 
final good of quantity Q requires goods or services S in fixed proportions such that S Qα= and 
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that S (denoted as intermediate in the following for simplicity) can be produced either completely 
in-house or be bought from external suppliers. The firm will choose the option that minimises the 
costs of the required quantity of the intermediate. 
Producing the intermediate in-house costs Ci(S) or ci(S)=Ci(S)/S per unit with c´<0. For the 
outsourcing firm, unit costs are composed by the market price p for purchasing the intermediate, 
observable transaction costs t for contracting suppliers and co-ordinating activities internally and 
externally, and additional unobservable firm-specific costs and benefits u (compared to in-house 
production), such as adjustment costs or knowledge spillover effects. Therefore total unit costs of 
outsourcing can be defined as co(S)=p(S)+t(S)+u. The market price of the intermediate p is 
assumed to be equal for all firms. Transaction costs t are firm-specific and depend on a firm’s 
endowment with information and computer technology (ICT), the amount of requested 
intermediates S, and several additional factors X discussed below, such that t=t(ICT,S,X). The 
amount of intermediates S bought reduces t since transaction costs are subject to economies of 
scale, i.e. t´<0. 
An important pre-requisite of the model is that ICT reduces transaction costs. This notion is based 
on the observation that ICT allows a faster and cheaper exchange of information between firms 
and thus helps to co-ordinate the activities of suppliers and clients more easily. This is important 
because outsourcing frequently induces an intensive interaction between buyer and supplier. As 
highlighted by Bensaou (1997) and Innocenti and Labory (2002), falling costs of ICT reduce the 
costs of finding appropriate suppliers and of comparing market prices of the intermediate 
(Grossman and Helpman, 2002). Moreover, ICT facilitates co-ordination of ordering, scheduling 
and payment systems between firms. The use of ICT has helped to apply Just-in-Time 
Management by accelerating the process of identifying the need for ordering, the accomplishment 
and transmission of the order, and the delivery of the intermediates. Moreover, as argued by Caroli 
(2003), ICT encourages the coding and digitalisation of knowledge and skills. Therefore tacit 
knowledge accumulated by employees can be more easily incorporated into the firms’ information 
system by codification. This helps firms to lower the risk of losing firm-specific knowledge, which 
can be conceived as transaction costs incurred by outsourcing in a broader sense.  
A variety of other firm-specific internal costs and benefits of outsourcing u are extremely difficult 
to observe. For example, the costs of adjusting a firm’s routines to outsourcing depends on the 
flexibility of its management and employees. The decision to outsource business processes may 
directly affect job tasks of individual workers, and the cost of reorganisation hinges on the ability, 
willingness and costs of workers to be trained for new tasks or the costs to lay them off. Moreover, 
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outsourcing business processes is associated with strategic dependence on suppliers and may thus 
incur risks of knowledge leakage. Besides unobserved costs, there may be also unobserved 
benefits from outsourcing, however. Co-operation with external suppliers may lead to learning and 
knowledge spillover effects, in particular if innovative intermediates are purchased externally.2 
Moreover, outsourcing may help to reduce insider bargaining power of workers. The management 
may threat to shift business processes to third parties in wage negotiations. We assume the sum of 
these unobserved costs and benefits u to be normally distributed across firms: ~ (0; )u φ σ . 
A firm decides to outsource the production of intermediates (OUTS=1) if total unit costs of 
externally purchased intermediates are lower than the unit costs of production in house: 
( ) ( ) ( )ip S t u c S+ • + < , or . This means that the probability of outsourcing is 
given by: , with 
( ) ( ) ( )iu c S p S t< − − •
Pr( 1) ( ) ( ) ( )iOUTS c S p S t= = Φ − − • )(( ) •Φ denoting the cumulative normal 
distribution. 
The unit cost functions of producing the intermediate S consist of fixed costs ξ and marginal costs 
r: ci(S) = / S rξ + . As highlighted by Bartel et al. (2005), in an equilibrium analysis, the rationale 
for outsourcing in this model is based on scale effects. If fixed costs ξ  are sufficiently large, it will 
be cheaper to buy S externally from a specialised firm that sells its products to several clients 
despite transaction and internal costs associated with outsourcing.3 The effect of the total amount 
of requested intermediates S is therefore ambiguous. On the one hand, scale economies in 
production decrease in-house production costs. On the other hand, the stronger bargaining power 
and scale economies in transaction costs reduces the costs of outsourcing for larger firms. 
Overall, a firm’s decision to outsource can be summarised by the following equation: 
( )Pr( 1) / ( ) ( , , ) (1).OUTS S r p S t ICT S Xξ= = Φ + − −  
For computational simplicity, we assume the observable transaction costs t to be a linear function 
of their arguments. Apart from ICT use and the quantity of intermediates needed, we consider a 
variety of further control variables X that may affect the outsourcing decision. A large share of 
skilled workers and thus tacit knowledge in the firm may imply that the exchange of knowledge 
                                                 
2  Nearly every fifth innovative firm in Germany cites suppliers as an important source of relevant 
knowledge for innovations, see Gottschalk et al. (2001). 
3  In reality, external suppliers of the intermediate goods may face further cost advantages, in particular 
lower variable costs due to specialisation and learning effects. The modelling of different production 
technologies, however, is beyond the theoretical scope of this paper. 
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with suppliers is more difficult and may involve higher risks of knowledge leakage.4 Exporting 
firms as well as firms belonging to conglomerates may face lower transaction costs since they are 
able to benefit from international contacts and existing networks in finding cheap and suited 
suppliers i.e. they face lower search costs in outsourcing (Osterman, 1994). Works councils 
frequently increase wages (Addison et al., 2001) or induce higher termination or overtime costs for 
core employees (Gramm and Schnell, 2001). This might lead to a higher inclination of firms to 
outsource part of production to cheaper suppliers.  
For simplicity, we model transaction costs as a result from the linear function 
0 1 ´t ICT Xβ β γ= + + . The empirical model of outsourcing can thus be summarised in the 
following form: 
0 1Pr( 1) ( ) (2),OUTS ICT Xβ β γ ′= = Φ + +  
which can be estimated using a conventional Probit approach.  
A natural extension of the model is to assume that there is a continuum of intermediate goods for 
which the ‘make or buy’ decision must be taken. Therefore, in the empirical part, we also use a 
linear model with the share of intermediates in total output as the dependent variable. This variable 
can be interpreted as accumulated outsourcing decisions in the past.  
3.2 Functional flexibility: a firm’s decision to introduce holistic work organisation 
Suppose that a firm has the choice to produce its output in two alternative regimes as proposed by 
Lindbeck and Snower (2000): either in a ‘Tayloristic’ type of work organisation (T) with each 
worker specialising in a specific subtask; or in a ‘holistic’ or functionally flexible organisation (H) 
based on team work, job rotation, flat hierarchies or multi-tasking (Osterman, 1994; Chadwick and 
Cappelli, 2002). Several empirical studies show that firms can increase their productivity by 
introducing functional flexibility (Macduffie, 1995; Ichniowski et al., 1997; Appelbaum et al., 
2000; Zwick, 2004). However, employees in flat hierarchies and teams need more training and 
probably demand a compensation for their increased responsibilities. In addition, installation for 
higher co-ordination and horizontal communication such as meeting rooms or Intranet are costly.  
Taking fixed costs of installed capital as given, costs of producing output Q in the Tayloristic 
regime are given by the simplest functional form CT(Q)=vQ+w, with v denoting variable costs and 
                                                 
4  In addition, high skilled employees may oppose outsourcing because their skills become obsolete and 
outsourcing might threat their work places (Ichniowski and Shaw, 1995; Zwick, 2002). 
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w being an i.i.d error term with expected value 0. The more productive holistic work organisation 
causes costs CT(Q) resulting from the function 
( ) ((1 ) ) (3),HC Q v Q uλ θ= − + +  
where λ (with 10 << λ ) represents the fraction by which the holistic organisation is more 
productive (or equivalently less costly for a given level of output) compared to the Tayloristic 
regime, and θ denotes additional unit costs in the holistic system resulting from more intense 
communication and co-ordination between employees and higher wage demands. While λ is 
assumed to be identical for all firms, co-ordination costs θ are assumed to be a function of ICT 
capital available as well as further observable factors summarised by X (see below), such that 
),( XICTθθ = . Finally, u again represents unobserved firm-specific variables affecting the 
relative costs of the holistic regime compared to a Tayloristic work organisation, such as adequacy 
of the firms’ products or services for team work, the willingness of employees to work in flat 
hierarchies or firm-specific internal organisation agreements. 
A firm will decide to introduce a holistic regime if CH(Q)<CT(Q) or if 
u w v
Q
λ θ− < − . With u and 
w following a normal distribution, the probability of a firm’s choosing the holistic regime is given 
by . Assuming in addition that ‘holistic’ coordination costs θ 
are a linear function of ICT and X, the empirical model simplifies to a conventional Probit 
approach: 
(Pr( 1) ( , )HOL v ICT Xλ θ= = Φ − )
0 1Pr( 1) ( ' ) (4).HOL ICT Xβ β γ= = Φ + +  
If the organisational form is chosen at the level of subunits in the firm and not for the firm as a 
whole, the empirical model may be replaced by a linear model with an intensity measure of 
functional flexibility as the dependent variable. 
Considering control variables X, we expect functional flexibility to be positively correlated with 
human capital in firms (such as a high share of highly qualified employees, apprenticeship training 
or continuing training) because they are complements to team work, quality circles, autonomous 
teams and other forms of employee involvement in high performance work organisations (Cappelli 
and Neumark, 2001; Jones and Kato, 2005). Highly qualified employees are also better able to 
analyse more abstract and formal information needed in team work production and to make use of 
the scope offered by higher responsibilities and more discretion (Lindbeck and Snower, 2000). 
Several observers note that incentive payments are a crucial prerequisite for high performance 
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workplace systems to be productive (Ichniowski et al., 1996; Ichniowksi, Shaw and Prennushi, 
1997; Cappelli and Neumark, 2000). Works councils help employers to spread the risk of long-
term training, development and innovation in work design, as well as on a high level of trust 
between managers and workers (Arnal et al., 2001; Kalleberg, 2001). They therefore might be 
positively correlated with functional flexibility. Works councils also have their agenda, however. 
Being concerned about losing their power basis, they may hamper autonomous work organisations 
that grant more discretion and responsibilities to the work floor (Godard, 2004; Zwick, 2004). 
Therefore, there might also be a negative relationship between works councils and the incidence of 
team work, quality circles and autonomous work groups.  
3.3 Specific hypotheses about ICT applications and flexibility 
Our analytical framework above predicts that ICT use and investments enhance both types of 
flexibility. In the first place, ICT use reduces transaction and co-ordination costs, making cheaper 
both co-operation between workers of the same firm and co-ordination with external suppliers. 
The data set allows us to discriminate between different types of ICT applications, whose expected 
impacts on organisational flexibility are briefly discussed in the following. 
We use the share of employees who mainly work with a PC (PCWORK) as an indicator for the 
intensity of ICT usage. ICT investment is directly measured by INVICT. The availability of an 
Intranet (INTRA) is an important tool for facilitating communication and sharing of knowledge in 
in-house communication. INTRA is thus expected to enhance the adoption of functional 
flexibility. In contrast, we expect no impacts of INTRA on the outsourcing decision of firms. The 
share of PCs connected to a network (NETPC) should be positively correlated to both sorts of 
flexibility, however, since broader access to networks not only enhances co-operation between 
employees within the same firms but possibly also with other firms. 
Training workers in IT-specific skills (ICTTRAIN) may be necessary for both the introduction of 
functional flexibility and outsourcing since tasks of employees may be changing in the course of 
these reorganisations. However, firms may be much more inclined to invest in workers’ skills 
under functional flexibility whereas investments in human capital enhance internal fixed costs 
which contradicts the idea of numerical flexibility. We thus expect ICTTRAIN to correlate 
positively with a higher degree of functional flexibility but not (or even negatively) with the 
propensity of outsourcing. 
We also dispose of information on the aims that firms pursue by using ICT. Development of new 
products is expected to be a goal of ICT usage applying to functional flexibility but not to 
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outsourcing. Using ICT in order to achieve payroll costs savings should be a specific goal of 
outsourcing decisions. In contrast, the production regimes based on functional flexibility tend to be 
associated with higher costs (for training, communication etc.) such that we expect no correlation 
or a negative one between the aim of saving costs with functional flexibility. 
3.4 Flexibility and Innovations 
We estimate the probability that an enterprise innovates by the following Probit model including 
the flexibility strategy and ICT activities according to section 2.3:5
0 1 2 3Pr( 1) ( _ _ ) (5),INNO FLEX FUNC FLEX NUM ICT Xβ β β β γ= = Φ + + + +  
where INNO is an indicator of whether an establishment has introduced a product innovation 
(PROD-INNO) or a process innovation (PROC-INNO) and FLEX_FUNC and FLEX_NUM are 
variables measuring numerical and functional flexibility (see next section). As mentioned earlier, 
we assume that functional flexibility increases product and process innovations. Numerical 
flexibility should have – if at all – only a short-term impact on product innovations if innovative 
intermediates contribute important new characteristics to final goods output while they may harm 
innovative capability in the long run. Numerical flexibility might induce lagged process 
innovations, however, if it takes time to adjust production processes to outsourcing decisions. 
Among the additional control variables, we first include measures of ICT use and investment in 
order to control for other channels than organisational flexibility through which ICT may enhance 
innovation capabilities. The potentially positive impact of enhanced vertical co-operation between 
employees and management on innovations is captured by the works council measure in vector X 
(Zoghi et al., 2005). Additional explanatory variables for innovations are financial incentives 
(INCENTIVE) – they are used to give non-managerial workers an incentive to come forward with 
innovations that might improve efficiency but also might put the worker´s own job at risk (Black 
and Lynch, 2005). The size of the firm (SIZE) might be positively related to innovations since 
there may be more product lines and services that are open to efficiency and quality 
improvements. Firm age (AGE) may negatively affect innovation since older institutions may be 
able to benefit more strongly from products already established in the markets. Moreover, older 
firms may find it costlier and more difficult to adjust internal processes and routines established 
over a longer period of time. 
                                                 
5  For a very similar approach, see Zoghi et al. (2005). 
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4 The Data 
The data used for empirical testing of the theoretical hypotheses stem from the ZEW survey on the 
diffusion and use of ICT among German firms. This survey is based on Computer-aided telephone 
interviews (CATI) among about 4,500 representatively chosen firms in Germany with five and 
more employees in the years 2002 and 2004. Apart from the large variety of indicators on the use 
of ICT and e-business, the survey includes information on organisational changes and workplace 
practices, innovation success and detailed characteristics of employees, including formal 
qualification, age, and the share of workers enrolled in training measures. The size of the firms is 
calculated from the number of full-time employees. Using only data on firms with information 
from both 2002 and 2004 and after excluding data with incomplete information on items 
employed, the sample used for the main empirical explorations includes about 900 firms. 
Descriptive statistics and short descriptions of the variables used in the empirical part of the study 
are summarised in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
In order to measure the importance of ICT usage and investment in the enterprise, we use the share 
of employees mainly working on a PC (PCWORK) and ICT investments (INVICT). We assume 
that these complementary measures give a comprehensive picture of both the importance of ICT 
for work practices and of financial importance of ICT. In extensions of the reference 
specifications, we also include the share of workers involved in ICT-specific training 
(ICTTRAIN), the average number of personal computers connected to a network per worker 
(NETPC), the existence of an Intranet (INTRANET) as well as two dummies indicating that ICT is 
used in the firm in order to develop new products (GOAL_INNO) and to save payroll costs 
(GOAL_PCOST). As illustrated in Table A2 in the Appendix, the alternative measures of ICT use 
are strongly correlated. 
In order to measure the degree of functional flexibility, we employ the share of employees of a 
firm working in autonomous teams, quality circles or job rotation, and financially autonomous 
work units. Applying the procedure suggested by Bresnahan et al. (2002), we construct a 
comprehensive measure of functional flexibility (FLEXFUNC) by aggregating the measures in 
standard deviations (STD) from sector means in the following way: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ([ ]PROFITSTDHIERARCHYSTDCIRCLESTDTEAMSTDSTDFLEXFUNC )+++=  . 
As proxies for numerical flexibility, we resort to two different measures of outsourcing. A first 
measure is the share of intermediate goods and services in total sales (INTERMED). A high value 
for INTERMED indicates that a large part of the value of goods and services sold has been 
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generated by suppliers. In this sense, INTERMED is a measure of accumulated outsourcing 
activities in the past. A second measure (OUTSOURC) of numerical flexibility is a dummy 
variable indicating whether a firm has outsourced business activities during the period 2001-2003. 
This variable is an indicator for an extension of numerical flexibility during the more recent past. 
5 Empirical Results  
5.1 Estimation Strategy 
In the first step, we explain functional and numerical flexibility by several ICT indicators and 
other factors. Disentangling the causal effects of ICT use on organisational flexibility is not an 
easy task, however. In fact, there are reasons to argue that the decisions to implement new 
technologies and to introduce new organisational forms are simultaneous (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1990). In this case, regressing measures of organisational flexibility on ICT variables and controls 
cannot be interpreted as causal effects but as correlations that may be due to complementarities 
between technology use and organisational change. 
There is one theoretical and one methodological reason, however, why we believe the results of 
our analysis should be interpreted as running from technology use to organisation. First, as argued 
by Bresnahan et al. (2002), prices of ICT goods and services have been falling dramatically over 
the past decades due to rapid technological progress and competition in the ICT sector. For 
individual firms, these price declines are exogenous changes that substantially increase the 
propensity to adopt these technologies. In contrast, there is no reason to believe that the costs of 
introducing organisational changes have changed in a similar order of magnitude (or even changed 
at all). This means that if ICT and organisational changes are complements, price decline in ICT is 
the external variation that increases both the demand for ICT and the attractiveness of 
organisational changes as its complement. Second, in our empirical approach according to 
equations (2) and (4), we employ a well-defined temporal sequence by using flexibility measures 
for 2004 as dependent variables and lagged values from 2002 for the explanatory variables.  
Similar endogeneity issues may also apply to the estimation of the innovation equations (5). To 
address these issues, we also employ a measure of innovation success referring to the time period 
2001-2003 and explanatory variables referring to 2001 for the most part.  
The share of intermediates and our composed functional flexibility measure are estimated in a 
linear model by OLS, while outsourcing is estimated by a Probit model. Moreover, we apply 
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instrumental variable (IV) approaches for our measures of flexibility making use of the hypothesis 
that ICT use affects innovation efforts primarily via organisational flexibility.  
5.2 Results 
In the first set of regressions reported in Table 1, we explore to what extent ICT use and 
investments favour the introduction of numerical and functional flexibility. We estimate equations 
(2) and (4) using three dependent variables: OUTSOURC (outsourcing yes/no) and INTERMED 
(expenditures for intermediate goods relative to sales) as proxies for numerical flexibility on the 
one hand, and the constructed measure FLEXFUNC for functional flexibility on the other. For 
each variable, we firstly conduct a parsimonious regression (with PCWORK and INVICT as the 
only ICT indicators) and, secondly, an extended regression with more detailed ICT variables. 
While the latter specifications give a more detailed picture of specific ICT applications, 
multicollinearity between the ICT measures may blur the real contributions of ICT use to 
organisational flexibility. This risk is substantially smaller in the parsimonious regressions. 
Considering the parsimonious specifications (1), (3), and (5) in Table 1, at least one of the two ICT 
variables turns out significantly positive in each of the specifications. INVICT increases the 
probability of outsourcing in the subsequent period, while PCWORK is positively associated with 
a higher share of intermediate goods in total sales. This result is consistent with our predictions if 
we consider PCWORK as the result of accumulated computer investments in the past and, 
similarly, INTERMED as the result of accumulated outsourcing activities. Both, computer use by 
workers and ICT investment are positive and significant in the regression with functional 
flexibility as the dependent variable. 
Including a set of additional variables measuring ICT use in more detail (columns 2, 4, and 6 in 
Table 1), the coefficients of PCWORK and INVICT lose a considerable part of their significance. 
As suggested above, this may be partially the result of high correlation between the different 
measures of ICT use (confer Table A2). Some interesting differences in the patterns of the detailed 
ICT measures occur. While all additional measures are insignificantly different from zero for the 
INTERMED variable, the number of personal computers connected to a network (NETPC) and the 
fact that a firm uses ICT for saving payroll costs (GOAL_PCOST) is associated with a 
significantly higher probability of outsourcing activities in subsequent periods. This shows that 
outsourcing firms focus on cost savings when using ICT. In addition, communication costs with 
external suppliers and information costs on market prices are reduced if the Internet is used. 
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In contrast, all the additional ICT use variables – except the dummy for cost savings via ICT – 
enter significantly positive in the regression for FUNCFLEX (equation 6). This shows that firms 
with a high degree of functional flexibility have invested strongly in ICT-specific training, dispose 
of an Intranet, have a relatively high number of PCs connected to networks, and they pursue the 
goal of developing innovative products and/or services with the help of ICT. These results show 
that functional flexibility obviously requires a much broader range of ICT applications than 
outsourcing activities. A possible explanation is that while ICT use for outsourcing activities is 
concentrated mainly on a small set of ‘gate keepers’ dealing with external suppliers, it is important 
that ICT is used by a predominant part of workers involved in functional flexibility. Finally, 
functional flexibility creates new demands on employee skills in contrast to outsourcing. These 
new communication skills and decision taking responsibilities are supported by the Intranet and 
ICT training. 
Also the coefficients of the control variables in the regression yield some noticeable results. Our 
hypothesis that firms with a well qualified workforce more frequently choose functional flexibility 
is not confirmed in our data: no indicator for functional flexibility is significantly positively 
correlated with the lagged share of employees with a university diploma (HIGHQUAL) or the 
share of apprentices (APPRENT).6 On the other hand, incentive wages (INCENTIVE), a further 
assumed complement to high performance workplaces, is more widespread in functionally flexible 
firms. Also according to our hypothesis, larger firms tend to resort to functional flexibility more 
frequently than smaller firms. Works councils obviously do not endorse functional flexibility 
because it reduces their power basis. Older firms use functional flexibility less intensively, 
probably in order to protect specific human capital investments of their employees.  
 
6   Further sensitivity checks revealed that the insignificance of the qualification variables may be due to 
the strong correlations between qualification ICT use. When we exclude PCWORK and INVIL from 
specification (5) in Table 1, the share of highly qualified employees is positive and significant at the 5 
percent level.  
 Numerical Flexibility Functional Flexibility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent var: OUTSOURC OUTSOURC  INTERMED  INTERMED FUNCFLEX FUNCFLEX 
 Coeff. S.e. Coeff. S.e. Coeff. S.e. Coeff. S.e. Coeff. S.e. Coeff. S.e. 
ICT indicators        
PCWORK 0.226  0.199 0.064 0.209 0.055** 0.028 0.052* 0.029 0.358*** 0.125 0.203 0.129 
INVICT 0.069 * 0.040 0.045 0.042 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.085*** 0.027 0.050* 0.027 
ICTTRAIN    0.154 0.239  0.022 0.038  0.423** 0.184 
INTRANET    -0.125 0.111  -0.017 0.015  0.149** 0.074 
NETPC    0.193** 0.089  0.008 0.010  0.095* 0.055 
GOAL_INNO    0.081 0.101  -0.022 0.014  0.177*** 0.067 
GOAL_PCOST    0.202** 0.102  -0.000 0.014  0.033 0.064 
Controls         
INVNONICT -0.027  0.034 -0.030 0.035 0.010* 0.005 0.011** 0.005 0.037 0.023 0.036 0.023 
HIGHQUAL -0.677 ** 0.308 -0.729** 0.315 -0.067 0.043 -0.070 0.044 0.080 0.207 -0.074 0.207 
LOWQUAL -0.411 * 0.212 -0.393* 0.211 -0.005 0.030 -0.006 0.031 -0.221 0.154 -0.230 0.151 
APPRENT -0.704  0.737 -0.761 0.736 -0.088 0.097 -0.077 0.098 -0.005 0.433 -0.164 0.430 
INCENTIVE 0.182  0.129 0.174 0.131 -0.008 0.017 -0.010 0.017 0.454*** 0.093 0.442*** 0.092 
U30 0.148  0.254 0.134 0.258 -0.054 0.035 -0.046 0.035 0.169 0.162 0.129 0.159 
EXP 0.223 ** 0.111 0.210 * 0.112 0.047*** 0.017 0.053*** 0.017 -0.056 0.079 -0.089 0.078 
AGE3 -0.082  0.191 -0.061 0.194 -0.021 0.027 -0.026 0.027 -0.131 0.138 -0.129 0.136 
AGE7 -0.239  0.157 -0.193 0.158 0.011 0.022 0.010 0.022 -0.223* 0.116 -0.188* 0.113 
GROUP 0.232 ** 0.107 0.219** 0.108 0.008 0.016 0.010 0.016 0.088 0.074 0.066 0.074 
WORKSCOUNC 0.334 *** 0.125 0.307** 0.127 0.029 0.018 0.030* 0.018 0.128 0.089 0.082 0.088 
EAST -0.182  0.120 -0.190 0.122 -0.012 0.016 -0.013 0.016 0.136* 0.079 0.150* 0.079 
SIZE20-50 -0.132 0.125 -0.109 0.127 -0.007 0.018 -0.004 0.018 0.158** 0.078 0.173** 0.077 
SIZE51-200 -0.011 0.129 0.038 0.133 -0.014 0.019 -0.011 0.019 0.192** 0.089 0.194** 0.089 
SIZE201-500 -0.020 0.173 0.062 0.178 -0.012 0.028 -0.002 0.028 0.227 0.139 0.213 0.138 
SIZE501-1000 0.531 ** 0.223 0.627*** 0.231 -0.013 0.031 -0.004 0.031 0.160 0.160 0.154 0.168 
SIZE>1000 -0.022 0.309 -0.005 0.328 -0.027 0.043 -0.027 0.046 1.047*** 0.257 1.064*** 0.262 
Constant 0.185 0.467 -0.224 0.488 0.501*** 0.070 0.509*** 0.073 0.447 0.320 0.033 0.323 
14 sectors yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo R² 0.109 0.116         
R2     0.259 0.262 0.159 0.185 
Observations 949 942 843 836 925 918 
 Significance levels: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1, heterogeneity robust standard errors, source: ZEW ICT surveys 2002 and 2004. 
Table 1: Characteristics of numerically and functionally flexible firms 
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Exporting firms (EXP) are frequently more numerically flexible than functionally flexible firms, 
which is consistent with the hypothesis that export activities help to cultivate international 
networks that facilitate finding appropriate suppliers. The results also confirm our conjecture that 
conglomerates (GROUP) can outsource easier. Firms controlled by works councils 
(WORKSCOUNC) are frequently numerically flexible, which may be due to the fact that 
remuneration in these firms is frequently particularly generous and lay-off rules for core 
employees strict.  
We used a composed measure of functional flexibility so far. As a check to the sensitivity of our 
results to this aggregation, we employ an alternative measure defined as the number of the 
following measures used by the firms in 2004: team work, independent work group, quality circles 
or job rotation (compare Table A1). If we use this functional flexibility indicator as the dependent 
variable in an ordered Probit estimation (see results reported in Table A3 in the Appendix), we 
find a pattern in the explanatory variables which is very similar to the one obtained in the OLS 
regressions of specifications (5) and (6) in Table 1: all ICT indicators have a positive and 
significant impact on functional flexibility. 
5.3 Consequences for product and process innovations 
In the second part of the empirical assessment, we analyse to what extent functional and numerical 
flexibility are associated with a higher propensity of firms to introduce new products and services 
(PRODUCT-INNO) or change processes (PROCESS-INNO). For this purpose, we run Probit 
regressions according to equation (5) with product and process innovations in 2004 as the 
dependent variables and our functional and numerical flexibility measures for 2002 as explanatory 
variables plus all the covariates in 2002 used in the previous part of the empirical exploration. 
Table 2 reports the marginal effects from these regressions evaluated at the sample means. 
Most strikingly, the regressions show that FUNCFLEX enters significantly positive in both, the 
product and process innovation estimations. This supports the hypothesis that intense horizontal 
co-operation among employees not only enhances product and services improvements, but also 
helps to adjust processes more easily.  
In contrast, outsourcing business activities is not associated with any statistically significant 
increase in the probability of product innovations after two years. However, outsourcing activities 
coincide with contemporaneous product innovations. This is shown in supplementary regressions 
reported in Table A4 in the Appendix. We interpret these results as evidence that firms may ‘buy’ 
innovations and expertise from external suppliers in the form of innovative intermediates that 
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significantly affect the quality of final goods or services. Sustained improvement of products and 
services, however, may suffer when, as argued in the theoretical part of the paper, conflicting 
interests between firms and lack of required internal tacit knowledge hamper innovation 
capabilities. Our results for outsourcing are reversed if we consider process innovations instead of 
product innovations. Outsourcing activities do affect subsequent process innovation success but 
not contemporaneous process innovation success. Outsourcing seems to trigger process 
innovations only after a time lag. Obviously enterprises need some time to adapt to the new 
organisation requirements after outsourcing.  
 
 Table 2: Flexibility and innovation propensity 
Variable PRODUCT-INNO PROCESS-INNO 
 coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. 
INTERMED -0.134 0.269 -0.528* 0.278 
OUTSOURC 0.068 0.116 0.329*** 0.121 
FUNCFLEX 0.162 *** 0.056 0.167*** 0.057 
PCWORK 0.302 0.195 0.098 0.192 
INVICT 0.072 * 0.042 0.084* 0.044 
INVNONICT -0.003 0.035 0.090** 0.037 
HIGHQUAL 0.421 0.312 -0.149 0.317 
LOWQUAL -0.485 ** 0.220 -0.303 0.224 
APPRENT -0.020 0.658 1.139* 0.659 
INCENTIVE 0.181 0.141 0.085 0.144 
U30 -0.109 0.264 -0.659*** 0.253 
EXP 0.316 ** 0.111 0.160 0.115 
AGE3 -0.140 0.202 -0.029 0.207 
AGE7 0.013 0.165 -0.144 0.167 
GROUP 0.182 0.116 -0.026 0.116 
WORKSCOUNC 0.204 0.136 0.193 0.140 
EAST -0.094 0.121 -0.127 0.122 
SIZE20-50 0.198 0.122 0.083 0.122 
SIZE51-200 0.298 ** 0.140 0.412*** 0.138  
SIZE201-500 0.475 ** 0.213 0.667*** 0.219 
SIZE501-1000 0.622 ** 0.275 0.436 0.295 
SIZE>1000 0.338 0.347 0.716* 0.398 
14 sectors yes Yes 
Pseudo R² 0.187 0.136 
N 860 861 
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Significance levels: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1, heterogeneity robust standard 
errors, source: ZEW ICT surveys 2002 and 2004. 
If outsourcing is practiced for a long period of time, the firm seems to lose its capacity for product 
and process innovations and its absorptive capacity for new information – confer the insignificant 
coefficients of INTERMED. 
A look at the other control variables reveals some patterns that are consistent with findings in the 
empirical innovation literature. There seems to be a tendency that a higher qualified workforce has 
a positive effect on product innovations while the qualification structure does not have an impact 
on process innovations. This finding is consistent with the view that innovation activities require 
tacit and firm-specific knowledge and exacerbate the strategic role of human capital development 
(Hatch and Dyer, 2004). Exporters are also more innovative – this may be due to the fact that they 
are exposed to more competitors with different competition strategies they can use as 
benchmarks.7 The dummies controlling for firm size show that the likelihood of firms to innovate 
is increasing in firm size (Cohen, 1995). Somewhat surprisingly, the results do not provide any 
evidence supporting the conjecture that younger firms or firms with a high share of young workers 
are particularly innovative.8 Finally, also the vertical communication channel between employees 
and management via works councils (Zoghi et al., 2005) does not seem to enhance the innovative 
capacity in Germany. 
5.4 Organisational flexibility as a link between ICT use and innovation success 
In the regression results from Table 2, we present some weak evidence that technology use 
positively affects innovation success. The coefficient for ICTINV is significantly positive, albeit at 
the 10% level only. In the case of process innovations, however, this result may be driven by the 
necessity to increase overall investment for renewing processes.9 The weak evidence of direct 
contributions of ICT use to innovations supports the view that ICT fosters innovation activities in 
firms mainly by contributing to organisational flexibility (as shown in the previous section). A 
                                                 
7  For an empirical assessment of the causal links between innovation and exports, see Ebling and Janz 
(1999) and Arnold and Hussinger (2005).  
8  The share of employees younger than 30 years is even significantly negative in the regressions for 
process innovations. A possible explanation for this odd result might be that the share of younger 
workers is particularly high in firms with less formalized production processes and therefore process 
innovations are difficult identify. 
9  This view is supported by the fact that investment in non-ICT capital goods (INVNONICT) enters 
significantly positive in the process innovation equation, too. 
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subset of these organisational adjustments, i.e. functional flexibility, directly contributes to 
innovation success. 
The observation that innovation contributions of ICT run primarily via organisational flexibility is 
backed by further regressions reported in columns (2) and (3) in Table A4 in the Appendix. These 
regressions replicate the specifications from Table A3 with the exception that the flexibility 
measures are omitted from the set of regressors. The results show that an omission of the 
flexibility indicators leads to an increase and gain in terms of statistical significance of the 
coefficients for INVICT and PCWORK whereas, for example, the coefficient of INVNONICT or 
other coefficients are not affected or even decrease.  
We exploit this latter finding for additionally using an IV approach to assess the innovation 
contributions of organisational flexibility. Wald-tests suggest that the extended set of ICT 
indicators (as employed in the specifications (2), (4) and (6) from Table 1) do not have any joint 
significant impact on the decision to innovate if we also include the flexibility indicators.10 
Therefore, we use the lagged ICT indicators INVICT, PCWORK, ICTTRAIN, INTRANET, and 
NETPC as instruments. Jointly with the theoretical arguments described in section 2 about the 
‘enabling’ character of ICT, this result suggests that the ICT variables are suitable instruments for 
the flexibility indicators.11
As illustrated in Table A5a, the IV estimation leads to a higher and more significant coefficient of 
functional flexibility while outsourcing stays insignificant. This increase in the coefficient of 
functional flexibility means that those firms that decentralize decisions and introduce teamwork 
due to strong ICT use and investments are also more innovative.12 This shows that indeed ICT 
increases innovation and absorptive capacities of firms mainly by supporting functional flexibility 
instead of a direct impact.13
                                                 
10  The joint significance test yield a p-value of 0.126 in the product innovation equation and 0.304 in the 
process innovation equation. 
11  Endogeneity tests (Wu-Hausman F-test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman χ²-test) indeed confirm that our 
flexibility measures are endogeneous.  
12  See Card (2000) for a theoretical treatment of the interpretation of instrumented variables. An alternative 
reason for the increase in the IV coefficients probably is that the flexibility indicators are measured with 
error and therefore are negatively biased (Griliches and Hausman, 1986). By adding additional 
information on the type of firms that are flexible this bias is reduced. 
13  Several tests and sensitivity checks support the validity of our IV approach. Correlations between 
instruments and flexibility measures are strong (see Staiger and Stock, 1997) – the ICT indicators are 
jointly and individually frequently highly significant predictors of outsourcing and functional flexibility 
(compare Table A5b). Sargan tests of overidentification do not reject the validity of our instruments. 
Finally, we check the robustness of our results estimating the innovation propensities in a linear 
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 6 Conclusions 
This paper investigates to what extent the usage of ICT fosters innovation activities by facilitating 
more flexible organisational structures in firms. ICT is seen as multi-purpose or enabling 
technology that possibly plays different roles in enterprises. We focus on functional flexibility, 
proxied by a comprehensive measure including the share of employees in team work, job rotation, 
profit centres and quality circles, and numerical flexibility, proxied by a firm’s decisions to 
outsource business processes and to buy a high proportion of intermediate goods and services from 
external suppliers. 
Our results from a large and representative data set of firms in Germany show that an intensive 
ICT use and high investments in ICT are associated with an increase in both types of flexibility. 
Flexibility requires higher transaction and coordination efforts either between employees 
(functional flexibility) or between firms (numerical flexibility). As ICT reduces these co-
ordination and transaction costs, it raises the incentives of firms to adopt flexible organisational 
forms. Functional flexibility is especially supported by the presence of an Intranet, a high share of 
employees using a PC, by ICT training and by the development of new products and services as a 
goal for ICT investments. In contrast, numerical flexibility is driven by usage of the Internet and 
ICT investments motivated by reductions of personnel costs. 
The impacts of both flexibility types on innovation activities also differ. Functional flexibility 
significantly increases the probability of product and process innovations in subsequent periods by 
more than 10 percent. Outsourcing, by contrast, leads to contemporaneous product innovations but 
there is no statistically significant product innovation effect in the long run. We interpret this result 
as evidence that outsourcing is frequently used to buy new and innovative intermediates that 
directly help to improve own products and services but that have no impact on own generic 
product innovation activities. Outsourcing leads to more process innovations after a time lag, 
however. Apparently, firms optimise their internal organisation structures and processes some time 
after the outsourcing contract. 
These results are robust with respect to various tests and sensitivity checks. Outsourcing and 
functional flexibility are endogeneous in the innovations estimations. Using several ICT indicators 
                                                                                                                                                                
probability model by OLS in order to allow for a direct comparison of the coefficients in the IV 
approach which is also based on a linear model. Compared to the Probit model, the coefficients of the 
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as instruments for both types of flexibility, we find that ICT is an important enabling technology 
for functionally flexible firms to innovate. It only plays a neglectable direct role for innovations, 
however. 
Overall, our representative empirical results highlight that organisational adjustments are a crucial 
way by which ICT contributes to innovation activities in the overall economy. ICT lowers the cost 
of communication and coordination both between employees and between firms. This helps firms 
to adopt more flexible organisational structures that contribute to own innovation activities. Our 
study shows that in the longer run, these innovation effects persist only if the absorptive capacity is 
increased by team work and decentralisation of decision power. 
                                                                                                                                                                
flexibility indicators are smaller (see Table A6) but the significance levels are similar. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Means Description 
INTERMED 0.347 share of intermediate goods in sales in 2001 
INTERMED03 0.346 share of intermediate goods in sales in 2001 
OUTSOURC 0.268 outsourcing in period 1999-2001 (yes/no) 
OUTSOURC04 0.248 outsourcing in period 2001-2003 (yes/no) 
SHARE INDEPENDENT WORK GROUPS 0.323 share employees involved in independent work groups 
end of 2002 
SHARE INDEPENDENT WORK GROUPS 
04 
0.314 share employees involved in independent work groups 
end of 2004 
SHARE TEAMWORK 0.225 share employees working in autonomous teams end of 
2002 
SHARE TEAMWORK 04 0.231 share employees working in autonomous teams end of 
2004 
SHARE QUALITY CIRCLES 04 0.205 share employees involved in quality circles 
GROUP04 0.618 existence of independent work groups 2004 (yes/no) 
TEAM04 0.384 existence of Team work 2004 (yes/no) 
CIRCLE 04 0.421 existence of Quality circles 2004 (yes/no) 
ROTATION 04 0.178 existence of Job rotation 2004(yes/no) 
PCWORK 0.507 share of employees mainly working at a PC 
INVICT 1836.238 log of investment in ICTin € per employee 2001 
INVNONICT 14275.650 investment in non-ICTin € per employee 2001 
HIGHQUAL 0.201 share of employees with university degree 2001 
LOWQUAL 0.555 share of employees with Fachschul degree or vocational 
training 2001 
APPRENT 0.056 share of apprentices in total number of employees 
INCENTIVE 0.284 share of workers receiving performance-based 
remuneration 
U30 0.280 share of employees 30 years and younger 
EXP 0.548 exporting firm (yes/no) 
AGE3 0.152 firm aged 3 years or less in 2001 (yes/no) 
AGE7 0.747 firm aged 4-7 years or less in 2001 (yes/no) 
GROUP 0.356 firm is part of group of companies (yes/no) 
WORKSCOUNCIL 0.345 works council (yes/no) 
EAST 0.221 firm located in East Germany (yes/no) 
ICTTRAIN 0.143 share of workers involved in ICT-specific training in 
2001 
INTRANET 0.419 firm disposes of Intranet (yes/no) 
NETPC 0.646 number PCs connected to networks relative to number 
of employees 
GOAL_QUAL 0.537 firm uses ICT for development of new products 
GOAL_PCOST 0.625 firm uses ICT for saving payroll costs 
Values from 2002 if not stated otherwise; yes/no indicates dummy variable. Sample values reported. 
Source: ZEW ICT surveys 2002 and 2004. 
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Table A2: Correlations between measures of ICT use 
 INVICT PCWORK ICTTRAIN NETPC INTRANET 
INVICT 1.000   
PCWORK 0.445 1.000  
ICTTRAIN 0.325 0.375 1.000  
NETPC 0.457 0.541 0.308 1.000  
INTRANET 0.200 0.179 0.220 0.200 1.000
 
 
Table A3: Ordered Probit estimation of individual functional flexibility measures 
Variable Functional Flexibility Functional Flexibility 
extended 
 coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. 
PCWORK 0.385 *** 0.144 0.200 0.151
INVICT 0.102 *** 0.032 0.067** 0.033 
INVNONICT 0.068 *** 0.025 0.069*** 0.026 
HIGHQUAL -0.292 0.221 -0.463** 0.232 
LOWQUAL -0.422 ** 0.171 -0.429** 0.173 
APPRENT 0.866 * 0.525 0.714 0.547 
INCENTIVE 0.432 *** 0.099 0.407*** 0.100 
U30 0.551 *** 0.187 0.542*** 0.189 
EXP 0.101 0.091 0.063 0.090 
AGE3 -0.153 0.149 -0.144 0.149 
AGE7 -0.220 * 0.130 -0.187 0.129 
GROUP 0.207 *** 0.079 0.179** 0.081 
WORKSCOUNC 0.202 ** 0.098 0.179* 0.098 
EAST -0.078 0.085 -0.064 0.086 
SIZE20-50 0.245 *** 0.093 0.263*** 0.095 
SIZE51-200 0.583 *** 0.101 0.590*** 0.102 
SIZE201-500 0.659 *** 0.153 0.630*** 0.156 
SIZE501-1000 1.001 *** 0.200 0.989*** 0.209 
SIZE>1000 1.498 *** 0.242 1.557*** 0.247 
ICTTRAIN    0.536*** 0.194 
INTRANET    0.168** 0.084 
NETPC    0.097* 0.059 
GOAL_QUAL    0.223*** 0.078 
GOAL_PCOST    0.018 0.077 
14 sectors yes yes
Pseudo R² 0.104 0.114
N 928 922
Significance levels: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1, heterogeneity robust standard errors 
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Table A4: Additional Innovation Estimations  
 (1) 
Product innovations, 
contemporary effects 
(2) 
Product innovations, 
lagged effects 
(3) 
Process innovations, 
lagged effects 
 coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. 
INTERMED 0.023 0.186   
OUTSOURC 0.281 *** 0.080   
FUNCFLEX 0.099 *** 0.038   
PCWORK 0.272 ** 0.138 0.322* 0.184 0.060 0.184 
INVICT 0.049 * 0.028 0.085** 0.040 0.110 *** 0.041 
INVNONICT 0.027 0.020 -0.007 0.033 0.054 0.034 
HIGHQUAL 0.436 * 0.225 0.469 0.295 0.057 0.301 
LOWQUAL 0.004 0.150 -0.341* 0.207 -0.224 0.213 
APPRENT 1.096 ** 0.498 -0.312 0.637 1.145 * 0.625 
INCENTIVE 0.246 ** 0.103 0.230* 0.131 0.180 0.134 
U30 0.120 0.184 0.043 0.251 -0.382 0.242 
EXP 0.544 *** 0.078 0.339*** 0.104 0.145 0.109 
AGE3 0.037 0.142 -0.027 0.186 -0.023 0.194 
AGE7 0.142 0.117 0.037 0.153 -0.139 0.154 
GROUP 0.054 0.081 0.179* 0.107 0.031 0.108 
WORKSCOUNC 0.090 0.092 0.169 0.128 0.165 0.130 
EAST 0.031 0.087 -0.066 0.112 -0.147 0.113 
SIZE20-50 0.167 * 0.088 0.226* 0.116 0.079 0.115 
SIZE51-200 0.336 *** 0.096 0.342*** 0.131 0.424 *** 0.132 
SIZE201-500 0.387 *** 0.139 0.518*** 0.200 0.688 *** 0.207 
SIZE501-1000 0.283 0.188 0.453* 0.264 0.455 * 0.272 
SIZE>1000 0.371 * 0.217 0.517 0.319 0.936 ** 0.382 
Constant -0.032 0.349 0.324 0.465 1.576 *** 0.488 
14 Sectors yes yes yes 
Pseudo R² 0.176 0.162 0.109 
N 1706 949 951 
 Significance levels: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1, heterogeneity robust standard errors. 
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Table A5a: Instrumental Variable Innovation Estimations 
 Product innovations, 
IV 
Process innovations, 
IV 
 coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. 
OUTSOURC -0.060  0.404 -0.025 0.389 
FUNCFLEX 0.312 ** 0.158 0.279* 0.146 
INTERMED -0.15 0.114 -0.257** 0.107 
INVNONICT 0.01 0.012 0.035*** 0.012 
HIGHQUAL -0.081 0.206 -0.244 0.198 
LOWQUAL -0.179 * 0.092 -0.122 0.087 
APPRENT -0.062 0.247 0.278 0.234 
INCENTIVE -0.059 0.069 -0.069 0.065 
U30 -0.169 0.129 -0.315*** 0.121 
EXP 0.140 ** 0.062 0.086 0.060 
AGE3 -0.034 0.074 -0.006 0.071 
AGE7 0.013 0.069 -0.032 0.066 
GROUP 0.008 0.051 -0.042 0.049 
WORKSCOUNC 0.075 0.053 0.07 0.050 
EAST -0.028 0.043 -0.037 0.041 
SIZE20-50 0.022  0.052 -0.012 0.049 
SIZE51-200 0.015  0.068 0.044 0.063 
SIZE201-500 0.058  0.088 0.089 0.085 
SIZE501-1000 0.088  0.105 0.038 0.100 
SIZE>1000 -0.066  0.15 0.011 0.140 
Constant 0.861 ** 0.334 1.221*** 0.315 
14 sectors yes yes 
N 858  859  
Significance levels: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1, heterogeneity robust standard errors.  
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Table A5b: First Step Results in Instrumental Variable Innovation Estimations 
 Product innovation Process innovation 
 OUTSOURC FUNCFLEX OUTSOURC FUNCFLEX 
 coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. 
INTERMED 0.039 0.081 0.465*** 0.171 0.041 0.081 0.460*** 0.171 
INVNONICT -0.013 0.011 -0.038 0.023 -0.013 0.011 -0.038 0.023 
HIGHQUAL -0.170* 0.097 0.617*** 0.205 -0.179* 0.097 0.641*** 0.204 
LOWQUAL -0.087 0.070 0.049 0.146 -0.086 0.070 0.046 0.146 
APPRENT 0.018 0.213 -0.037 0.449 0.021 0.213 -0.044 0.449 
INCENTIVE 0.059 0.042 0.389*** 0.089 0.058 0.042 0.393*** 0.089 
U30 0.020 0.081 0.562*** 0.169 0.018 0.080 0.565*** 0.170 
EXP 0.101*** 0.035 -0.069 0.074 0.101*** 0.035 -0.071 0.074 
AGE3 -0.056 0.061 -0.023 0.129 -0.056 0.061 -0.023 0.129 
AGE7 -0.099** 0.050 -0.042 0.106 -0.100** 0.050 -0.040 0.106 
GROUP 0.118*** 0.034 0.199*** 0.072 0.118*** 0.034 0.200*** 0.072 
WORKSCOUNC 0.049 0.041 -0.057 0.086 0.048 0.041 -0.055 0.086 
EAST 0.019 0.037 0.059 0.078 0.020 0.037 0.056 0.078 
SIZE20-50 0.004 0.039 0.168** 0.081 0.004 0.039 0.170** 0.081 
SIZE51-200 0.045 0.042 0.379*** 0.089 0.044 0.042 0.379*** 0.089 
SIZE201-500 0.009 0.061 0.341*** 0.129 0.005*** 0.061 0.354*** 0.128 
SIZE501-1000 0.225*** 0.081 0.453*** 0.170 0.225 0.081 0.453*** 0.170 
SIZE>1000 0.027 0.102 0.616*** 0.216 0.028** 0.102 0.615*** 0.216 
INVICT 0.029** 0.013 0.059** 0.028 0.029 0.013 0.059** 0.028 
PCWORK -0.099 0.062 0.108 0.131 -0.097 0.062 0.102 0.131 
ICTTRAIN 0.162** 0.078 0.600*** 0.164 0.151** 0.077 0.627*** 0.162 
INTRANET -0.047 0.034 -0.016 0.073 -0.044 0.034 -0.023 0.072 
NETPC 0.058** 0.028 0.028 0.059 0.059** 0.028 0.027 0.060 
Constant 0.524 0.159 -0.843 0.335 0.525 0.159 -0.846 0.335 
14 sectors yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 858 858 858 858 858 858 858 858 
Significance levels: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1, heterogeneity robust standard errors.  
 29
Table A6: OLS Innovation Estimations 
 Product innovations, 
OLS 
Process innovations, 
OLS 
 coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. 
OUTSOURC 0.025 0.035 0.084** 0.034 
FUNCFLEX 0.050 *** 0.017 0.048*** 0.016 
INTERMED -0.042 0.082 -0.154* 0.079 
INVNONICT 0.009 0.011 0.033*** 0.010 
HIGHQUAL 0.180 ** 0.091 0.004 0.087 
LOWQUAL -0.120 * 0.069 -0.082 0.066 
APPRENT -0.010 0.215 0.265 0.206 
INCENTIVE 0.047 0.043 0.022 0.041 
U30 -0.026 0.082 -0.177** 0.079 
EXP 0.113 *** 0.035 0.066* 0.034 
AGE3 -0.046 0.062 -0.012 0.060 
AGE7 0.004 0.051 -0.031 0.049 
GROUP 0.058 * 0.035 -0.012 0.034 
WORKSCOUNC 0.064 0.041 0.051 0.039 
EAST -0.031 0.037 -0.04 0.036 
SIZE20-50 0.066 * 0.039 0.021 0.037 
SIZE51-200 0.100 ** 0.042 0.119*** 0.041 
SIZE201-500 0.141 ** 0.060 0.162*** 0.057 
SIZE501-1000 0.178 ** 0.080 0.115 0.077 
SIZE>1000 0.094 0.104 0.154 0.100 
Constant 0.530 *** 0.127 0.911*** 0.122 
14 sectors yes yes 
Pseudo R² 0.213 0.133 
N 875 877 
Significance levels: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1, heterogeneity robust standard errors 
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